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Comment
Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The
Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court Opinion
Courtney A. Waggoner*

I. INTRODUCTION

1

Throughout the past twenty years, the United States judicial system
has seen many changes in what governmental acts pass constitutional
muster. 2 One of the most hotly debated and rapidly evolving areas of
constitutional law concerns the government's use of peremptory
challenges in jury selection. 3 Little more than a century ago, states had
4
the right to statutorily exclude certain races entirely from the jury pool.
Only in the past two decades, however, has the Supreme Court outlawed
prosecutorial peremptory challenges based on race. 5 Further, it was not
until 1994 that the Court opined that gender was no longer a tolerable
J.D. expected May 2005. I would first like to thank my family and friends, especially my
parents, Rick and Debbie Waggoner and my sister, Erin de Lucia, for their constant
encouragement and unwavering support, not only throughout the writing of this article, but in all
of my endeavors. I would also like to thank the members and editorial board of the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal for all of their advice and hard work, without which, this article
would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the faculty and
administration at Loyola, and thank them for their support in the production of the Journal.
1. Please note that "peremptory challenge" will be used interchangeably with "peremptory
strike" throughout this Comment.
2. See infra Parts II, III
(discussing the changes concerning the constitutionality of peremptory
challenges).
3. A peremptory challenge is a means by which a prosecutor can remove a potential juror
from the jury pool without cause. Peter Michael Collins, Taking Batson One Giant Step Further:
The Court Prohibits Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 44
CATH. U. L. REv. 935, 938 (1995).
4. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) (holding unconstitutional a West
Virginia statute that banned African-Americans from the jury pool). "And how can it be
maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a
panel from which the state has expressly excluded every man of his race.., is not a denial to him
of equal legal protection." Id.
5. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (opining that eliminating a juror
based on his or her race is violative of one's constitutional rights).
*
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ground on which to exercise a peremptory strike. 6 The Court's
movement to protect these two classes has prompted other similarly
suspect classes to argue that they are also entitled to the same
protections. 7
More specifically, several recent decisions have
the use of
questioned whether states should be permitted to allow
8
peremptory strikes based upon a potential juror's religion.
Although courts are split on the treatment of religion-based
peremptory challenges, the United States Supreme Court has yet to
resolve the issue. 9 Because of this failure to address the uncertainty
surrounding the removal of jurors based upon religious beliefs, courts
are left to articulate their own opinions, sometimes based on confusing
and inaccurate reasoning. 10 While some courts are unwilling to provide
religion with the protection granted to race and gender, others make no
distinction andI I grant the protection of individual rights to all of the
above classes.
Part II of this Comment will examine the classes meant to be
protected by the Equal Protection Clause, the history surrounding
6. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (admonishing the State's
use of gender as a basis for peremptory challenges). "Disbrimination in jury selection, whether
based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors
who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process." Id. at 140.
7. See infra Part ll.B. 1 (discussing the treatment of religion as a suspect class).
8. See generally United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges based on religious beliefs as opposed to religious affiliation);
United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998) (scrutinizing in dicta the use of
peremptory challenges in relation to religious beliefs and affiliation); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 772 (Minn. 1993) (upholding the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in response to
a potential juror's affiliation with the Jehovah's Witness faith), cert. denied by 511 U.S. 1115
(1994).
9. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (denying certiorari to 504 N.W.2d 767
(Minn. 1993)). Justice Thomas's dissent argued that the issue should be heard and that strict
scrutiny analysis should be applied peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. See infra Parts II.C.7, III (analyzing the different methods courts have used to address
peremptory challenges and religion); see also Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. at 1115 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court should hear a Minnesota case dealing with religion
and peremptory challenges); DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 500 (declining to reverse a decision to uphold
peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation); Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1114 (distinguishing
between religious beliefs and religious affiliation); Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 767 (holding that
peremptory challenges based on religion violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. See infra Parts II.C.7, III (analyzing the different methods courts have used to address
peremptory challenges and religion); see generally DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (discussing
peremptory challenges exercised by the State to remove two jurors based on their degrees of
religious involvement); Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (analyzing the use of peremptory challenges in
relation to religious beliefs and affiliation); Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (upholding the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges in response to a potential juror's affiliation with the Jehovah's
Witness faith).
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peremptory challenges, and the key decisions that have led to race and
gender protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Part II will also
explain the treatment of religion as a suspect class and the prohibition of
peremptory challenges based on race and gender. 13 Part III will then
examine recent cases dealing with peremptory challenges and religion
and the difference in reasoning used in the Third and Seventh Circuit
Courts of the United States. 4 Then, Part IV will look at the
consequences of treating religion as a suspect class in the context of
peremptory challenges. 15 Part IV will also look at the potential
eradication of peremptory challenges altogether due to the protection of
yet another class of individuals. 16 Finally, Part V will recommend that
the Supreme Court grant certiorari to examine religion-based
peremptory challenges and set forth the appropriate framework for the
limitations on government actions in this area. 17 This Part will then
propose that the Supreme Court allow for this protection but distinguish
between a potential juror's religious affiliation and his or her religious
beliefs. 18
II. BACKGROUND
Peremptory challenges have long been an integral litigation tool in
the United States judicial system; this section will address the history
and continuing reformation of these vital judicial mechanisms. 19 Part
II.A of this section will begin with an explanation of the purpose and
policies behind peremptory challenges. 20 It will explain the origin and
importance of allowing a litigant to strike a potential juror without cause
12. See infra Parts II, III (detailing the historical development of the use of peremptory
challenges and the recent treatment of religion and peremptory challenges).
13. See infra Parts II.A-II.C.5 (explaining the legal development of peremptory challenges,
the Equal Protection Clause, suspect classes, and the line of cases holding peremptory strikes
based on race and gender to be invalid).
14. See infra Part III (evaluating the Third and Seventh Circuit cases related to peremptory
challenges and religion, and explaining how the various circuits have utilized different
reasoning).
15. See infra Part IV.B (identifying the potential problems for peremptory challenges with the
protection extended to religion).
16. See infra Part IV.B (describing how the total elimination of peremptory challenges poses a
potential problem with the extension of protection to religion).
17. See infra Part V (arguing that the Supreme Court must set forth an opinion on the
limitations of peremptory challenges and religion).
18. See infra Part V (recommending that the Supreme Court establish a definitive opinion on
the status of peremptory challenges and religion).
19. See Part II (detailing the historical development of peremptory challenges, their past
limitations and the related cases).
20. See infra Part II.A (differentiating between "for cause" and "peremptory" challenges and
explaining the legal principles behind the two).
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by use of a peremptory challenge. 2 1 Part II.B will discuss the
Fourteenth Amendment generally and the Equal Protection Clause's
different standards of review based upon class. 22 This Part will also
discuss some of the classes that are regularly granted strict scrutiny
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, and will show how the
Court should extend this protection to religion. 23 Part II.C will begin by
presenting a brief history of racial discrimination before moving into the
central cases shaping the use of peremptory challenges. 24
After
chronicling the historical exclusion of African-Americans from juries
altogether, this Part will explore the major cases leading up to the
Supreme Court's decision that race-based peremptory challenges are
constitutionally unacceptable. 25 Part II.C will then discuss in detail the
Supreme Court opinion holding that gender-based peremptory
challenges are also unconstitutional.2 6 Finally, Part II.C will conclude
with a discussion of two state supreme court cases dealing with religion
and peremptory challenges, State v. Davis and People v. Wheeler.27
A. Tools for Excusing a PotentialJuror:For Cause and Peremptory
Challenges
The United States Constitution guarantees each defendant accused of
a crime the right to a trial by jury. 28 Prior to trial, a large number of
potential jurors are considered for the twelve or fewer jury spots. 29 After
21. See infra Part II.A (comparing the elimination of potential jurors by use of cause and
peremptory challenges).
22. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See infra Part II.B (illustrating how the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been extended to religion).
24. See infra Part II.C. 1-5 (analyzing the historical treatment of discrimination in peremptory
challenges); see also United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) (addressing
peremptory challenges exercised by the State to remove two jurors based on their degrees of
religious involvement).
25. See infra Part II.C.2-3 (delineating the two main cases, Swain v. Alabama and Batson v.
Kentucky, which have contributed to the holding that peremptory challenges based on race violate
the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. See infra Part II.C.5 (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. and the Court's holding that
gender stereotypes are an improper basis upon which to exercise a peremptory challenge).
27. See infra Part II.C.7 (examining State v. Davis and People v. Wheeler, in which the
Minnesota and California Supreme Courts consider peremptory challenges based on religion).
See also State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal.
1978).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. Sherry F. Colb, Too Religious for the Jury?: A Federal Court Upholds Peremptory
Challenges Based on Religious Involvement, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20031105.html
(last visited May 24, 2004). Only six states permit juries with fewer than twelve members to
decide felony cases, but nearly twenty states permit small juries in misdemeanor cases. GEORGE
F. COLE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 479 (6th ed. 1992).
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a "pool" of potential jurors is formed through jury summons, the group
is broken up into smaller units for specific trials. 30 Once organized into
these smaller groups, the judge and attorneys for each side question the
venire about various topics, including personal background, personal
opinions, and life experiences. 3 1 This process of learning about any
propensities or biases that a juror might have in relation to fairly
weighing the evidence is called "voir dire." 32 Through the process of
voir dire, an attorney may challenge a prospective juror in one of two
ways: for cause or by use of a peremptory challenge. 33 If an attorney
can prove, based on the prospective juror's answers, that he or she is
incapable of serving 34on the jury, an unlimited amount of jurors can be
eliminated for cause.

30. Voir Dire: Creating the Jury, at http://www.crfc.org/americanjury/voir-dire.html (last
visited May 24, 2004).
31. Venire is defined as "a panel of persons who have been selected for jury duty and from
among whom the jurors are to be chosen." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (7th ed. 1999). See
also Creating the Jury, supra note 30. Some examples of the types of questions that may be
asked of potential jurors in a murder case are as follows:
"You'll be seeing sad pictures of Johnny - the way he looked after his dead body was
left in a ditch... [w]ill this make you so angry you won't be able to be objective... T'
"Anyone feel they could decide a civil case where money is concerned, but don't want
to serve on a criminal murder case?"
"Is there anyone here who doesn't watch news on television on a regular basis?"
"Is there anyone on the panel who does not agree that you will decide this case only on
what you hear in this courtroom?"
"Have you known anyone who was murdered or whom someone attempted to murder?
Or have you known the family of a murder victim or attempted murder victim?"
"Have any of you ever been trained in medical areas - for example, as a doctor, nurse,
or emergency technician - or does anyone close to you have any type of medical
training?"
"There will be a police officer here to testify. How many of you think that simply
because a police officer says something, it must be true?"
JURY SELECTION: SAMPLE VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS, 558-69 (Starr Litigation Services, Inc. ed.,
2001).
32. "Voir dire" is an Anglo-French term that literally means "to speak the truth" and is
defined as "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide
whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 3 1, at 156; see also Creating the Jury, supra note 30 (explaining the literal definition
of voir dire).
33. Collins, supra note 3, at 937-38. "While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on
a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits
rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 135 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. Colb, supra note 29. An attorney can challenge a prospective juror "for cause" if that
person states or otherwise expresses a bias against the attorney's case. Id. A juror who has been
struck for cause is one who "could not be trusted to engage in neutral, objective fact-finding." Id.
The number of for cause strikes is not set by law, and will "depend entirely on the number of
potential jurors about whose ability to carry out their duties either party can convincingly raise

290
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Another method available to prosecutors to excuse jurors is the
peremptory challenge. 35 Unlike a for-cause elimination, a peremptory
36
challenge allows an attorney to strike a juror without justification.
Instead, peremptory challenges are based on things such as intuition or
past experiences. 37 These discretionary strikes made their way into
American law from England and have been codified in federal statutes
since 1790.38 Peremptory challenges are imperative not only for
occasions where a for-cause challenge has been denied, but also when
the concern about a potential juror's fairness is not enough to illicit a
for-cause challenge. 39
During early examinations, courts were
disinclined to question the underlying motives of a peremptory
challenge. 40 However, following several landmark cases, attorneys are
now prohibited from using peremptory challenges to remove a juror
4
based on race or gender. '
B. The Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection Clause Analysis
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
serious questions to the judge." Id.
35. Collins, supra note 3, at 938.
36. Id.
37. Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: ProhibitingPeremptory Challenges
that Violate a Prospective Juror'sSpeech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 576
(1996).
38. Id. at 575 (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119). The framers initially
considered including the right to peremptory challenges in the Constitution, but ultimately
rejected the idea. Pamela R. Garfield, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Discrimination by any
Other Name..., 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 169, 172 (1994).
39. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993); see generally John P. Marks, Bader v.
State: The Arkansas Supreme Court Restricts the Role Religion May Play in Jury Selection, 55
ARK. L. REV. 613 (2002) (discussing an Arkansas Supreme Court decision regarding the State's
use of peremptory challenges based on religion).
40. E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) (holding that the Constitution does
not require an explanation of the motives behind peremptory challenges). See also Jeb C.
Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind Questionnaire: The Most PracticalSolution for Ending
the Problem of Racial and Gender Discrimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the
Necessary Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323, 327 (2003)
(outlining the origins of the United State's inheritance of the peremptory challenge from England
during colonial times).
41. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-19 (holding that the Constitution does not require an
explanation of the motives behind peremptory challenges). The Court found the purpose of
peremptory challenges justifies its use against any person for any reason. Id. at 212. See Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that State's peremptory challenge would be deemed
unconstitutional unless supported by a race neutral explanation). Batson overruled Swain v.
Alabama. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam) (limiting the protections
afforded to race and gender-based peremptory challenges); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 144-46 (1994) (extending heightened scrutiny to gender when deciding the basis for
peremptory challenges).
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all citizens are guaranteed equal protection of the law. 42 In an effort to
reconcile this constitutional promise with legislative measures, the
judicial system has refused to uphold any law that imposes upon a
specific fundamental right or targets a suspect class. 43 In determining
whether a governmental action is unconstitutional, the Court has
developed a three-standard approach: rational basis, intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. 44 The applicable standard of review dictates
45
the amount of deference that courts will give to the legislative action.
If a challenged legislative measure does not specifically affect a
suspect class or does not endanger a fundamental right, then it will only
undergo a rational-basis review. 46 Rational-basis review consists of
determining whether the challenged classification is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.47 When drafting regulations that are aimed at
generally benign areas, such as economic regulation, states are given
as long as it does not infringe upon
leeway to create 4legislation
8
rights.
fundamental
The middle level of scrutiny is called intermediate scrutiny, which is
sometimes applied to classes warranting a heightened level of
protection. 49 In determining whether an action that is subject to
intermediate scrutiny is constitutionally valid, courts will analyze: (1)
the importance of the governmental objective; and (2) whether the
50
objective can be fulfilled by using the classification at issue.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 for the
purpose of "securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generation had
been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the [majority] race enjoy[s]." Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (examining the constitutionality of an
amendment to the Colorado state constitution that prohibited all executive, legislative, and
judicial actions designed to protect homosexual citizens from discrimination). The Court stated
that it would uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so
long as the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate
end. Id.
44. Marianne E. Kreisher, Religion: The Cognizable Difference in Peremptory Challenges, 5
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 131, 136 (1995) (detailing the three standards used in equal protection
analyses: (1) rational basis; (2) intermediate scrutiny; and (3) strict scrutiny).
45. Id.
46. See id. (describing the positive correlation between stricter standards of review and a
challenge's effect on a suspect class).
47. Id.
48. See id. (implying that states tend to have fewer restraints in creating legislation when there
is low risk of adverse effects on fundamental rights).
49. Id. at 137. The classes most often warranting this intermediate level of scrutiny are
gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and Law: An
Introduction to the Origins and Evolution of the Equal ProtectionPrinciple, 24 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 425, 446-47 (2004).
50. Kreisher, supra note 44, at 137 (discussing the factors used to determine constitutionality
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Intermediate scrutiny is not as rigorous as strict scrutiny; therefore,
classifications that would sometimes be deemed unconstitutional if
affecting a class subject to strict scrutiny are permitted. 51 However, in
the case of peremptory challenges, gender, which is traditionally subject
only to intermediate scrutiny, has been held to a standard equivalent to
52
strict scrutiny.
When a class is deemed "suspect" 53 under equal protection analysis,
legislation may not single out members of that class unless that
54
legislation is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest.
This form of scrutiny applied to regulations affecting suspect classes is
labeled "strict scrutiny." 55 Strict scrutiny triggers a presumption against
under intermediate scrutiny). "When applying the intermediate level of scrutiny, courts examine
whether the classification 'serve[s] important governmental objectives and [is] substantially
related to [the] achievement of those objectives."' Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).
51. See id. at 136-37 (contrasting results under intermediate scrutiny with results under strict
scrutiny).
52. See infra Part II.C.5 (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.); see also Rainey v.
Chever, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based classification
imposing support obligations on fathers of out of wedlock children); Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (discussing the current stance of law as subjecting gender to
intermediate scrutiny); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (examining the
State's use of gender as a basis for peremptory challenges). J.E.B. held that the State's use of
peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes, did not provide substantial aid to litigant's
efforts to secure fair and impartial juries, and therefore failed to withstand heightened scrutiny.
Id. at 140, 143.
53. A suspect class is defined as a group "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1975)).
54. Colleen Carlton Smith, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private
Schools in State School Choice Programs,89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1990-91 (2003). The
framework to evaluate most equal protection claims is: "(1) Does the government's classification
target a suspect (or semi-suspect) class; and (2) [Ihf so, does the state have a sufficiently
compelling interest that justifies targeting the selected group?" Id. at 1991 (citing Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 17). "Under... Equal Protection analysis, the strict scrutiny standard is: ... the law or
practice at issue must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest." Benjamin
Hoorn Barton, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v.
Alabama: An Equal Protectionand First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REV. 191, 208 (1995)
(citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986)).
55. Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 867-68 (2004). See also JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 575 (4th ed. 1991)
(explaining when strict scrutiny is used); Kreisher, supra note 44, at 136-37 (defining strict
scrutiny). Strict scrutiny analysis "is the highest level [of scrutiny] and applies to classifications
based on suspect classes and fundamental rights." Id. at 136.
Under strict scrutiny the courts will not defer to the legislature but, instead, will engage
in an independent analysis to determine whether the classification serves a compelling
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a law or practice when that law or practice is aimed at a particularly
sensitive class of persons. 56 The strict scrutiny approach attempts to
weigh the government interest against the risk of discriminatory effects
or outcomes. 57 Although equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment was initially created in response to racial inequalities, the
constitutional protections have been extended to gender and other
classes.5 8 The Supreme Court has created a hierarchy of classes, where
some classes are inherently more suspect than others. 59 Based on this
scheme, the Court has subjected certain laws and practices to60 higher
levels of scrutiny, depending upon the class's level of suspicion.
1. Is Religion a Suspect Class?
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of the United States by legislative
action or judicial practices. 6 1 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
constitutional provision to mean that any law or practice that burdens a
fundamental right or is aimed at a suspect class is unconstitutional, and
therefore will not be upheld.6 2 The Court treats both race and gender as
suspect classes for the purposes of peremptory challenges, forcing the
Court to weigh the legitimate 63interests of the state against those of the
proposed action or legislation.
governmental interest. This test is applied to legislation that deals with fundamental
constitutional rights, or classifications based on "race, alienage, or national origin."
Id. at 136-37.
56. See Kreisher, supra note 44, at 137 (describing the strong presumption strict scrutiny
creates against a law or practice).
57. See id. (explaining the balancing test included under the strict scrutiny standard).
58. See Hamburger, supra note 55, at 867 (analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment and the
different standards of scrutiny).
59. Id. "The Supreme Court has had to distinguish among different classifications and has
adopted a scheme in which some [classes] are more 'suspect' than others." Id. While race and
national origin are subject to the highest level of scrutiny, classifications such as age and "mental
retardation" do not call for such strict standards. City of Cleburne. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 441-43 (1985) (holding that "mental retardation" is not a classification calling for a
more strenuous standard of review than that given to social or economic legislation).
60. See id. (holding that an equal standard of review should apply to mental capacity and
social or economic legislation).
Moreover, the Court has had to subject different types of classification to different
degrees of scrutiny, initially because the Equal Protection Clause did not specify any
forbidden classification, but especially during the past half century because the clause
has increasingly been understood to protect against not only unequal constraints on
natural liberty but also unequal privileges from government.
Id. at 867-68.
61. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
62. Id.
63. See infra Part II.C.1-5 (discussing cases that have held race and gender to be an
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As seen in multiple opinions, the Court has routinely held race to be a
per se suspect class, demanding a legitimate purpose from the state
before upholding the act. 64 The purpose behind these opinions was to,
in effect, eliminate state-supported racial discrimination. 65
The
Supreme Court's treatment of gender parallels that of race when dealing
with peremptory challenges. 66 The Court has opined that gender-based
discrimination is as damaging as race-based discrimination. 67 Both race
and gender are immutable characteristics that can serve to impose
stigmas on certain sectors of the population. 68 Some argue that because
religion is not necessarily inherent and unchangeable that it should not
merit the same protection as race and gender. 69 However, religion
impermissible ground upon which to exercise a peremptory challenge).
64. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-95 (1987) (scrutinizing Georgia death
penalty cases and the statistical evidence surrounding the disproportionate death penalty
sentencing of African-Americans); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (discussing
whether a Florida court should award sole custody of a child to the father because the mother was
cohabitating with an African-American man); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.,
429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (discussing a village zoning decision and its relation to racial
discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (analyzing a law, though neutral
on its face, served to affect a disproportionate number of members of a certain race); Loving v.
Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (analyzing whether a statutory scheme adopted by Virginia to
make it unlawful for races to intermarry is within constitutional boundaries); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama law that changed
voting boundaries, in effect removing Afican-American voters from the district); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) (analyzing whether a San Francisco ordinance regarding
laundry permits, which served to effectually discriminate against Chinese immigrants in the city,
violated the Constitution).
65. JEROME A. BARRON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY-CASES
AND MATERIALS 594 (6th ed. 2002).
66. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (examining a law that allowed
women over eighteen years of age to consume alcohol, while men needed to be at least twenty
one years old before they were permitted to consume alcohol); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 682 (1973) (discussing the right for a woman to claim her spouse as a dependent for
purposes of attaining medical and dental benefits equal to those of males claiming their spouses);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (striking down a law that gave males a preference over
females in regard to estate administration).
67. In Bakke, Justice Brennan opined that "gender-based classification too often [has] been
inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of society."
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In the Brief of the Appellees in Frontiero v. Richardson,
the Solicitor General wrote that "sex, like race or national origin, is a visible and immutable
biological characteristic that bears no necessary relation to ability." Brief for Appellees at 10,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694).
68. BARRON ET AL., supra note 65, at 594 (describing the detrimental effects of a class-based
society).
69. Kreisher, supra note 44, at 165.
It is usually easy to determine a person's race and gender based solely on appearance.
However religion is not usually apparent to the naked eye; "religious affiliation (or
lack thereof) is not as self-evident as race or gender." It is sometimes possible to look

2004]

Peremptory Challenges and Religion

should, and does, enjoy many of the same protections as other suspect
classes because the freedom to choose one's religion is a right granted
by the Constitution. 70 In addition, some courts
have even gone so far as
71
characteristic.
immutable
an
religion
to deem
Further, individual religions have been the basis of a long history of
discrimination, much like race and gender. 72 Although the Supreme
at the name or physical characteristics of a person and guess that person's religion.
However, religion is different from race and gender in that the only way to determine a
person's religion with certainty is to inquire. Even then it is difficult to determine how
great an influence religious belief has on the individual. Although religion is an
association based on conscience, it is important to recognize that religious affiliation is
a voluntary choice and can be changed.
Id. at 167-68 (quoting State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993)).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "In short, when we are presented with a state law granting a
denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we
apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246
(1982). "[D]iscrimination ... [that is] purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to
depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other
considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens ... would be pure
favoritism, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes." Am.
Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900).
71. Kreisher, supra note 44, at 165. In some instances, the legislature has provided by statute
that religion is immutable. Id. (arguing that the religious beliefs of a potential juror may create
such a bias that the litigant should be permitted to strike a potential juror based on his religious
beliefs); see also Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987) (addressing a civil
rights violation and holding that to support such a claim a plaintiff must show membership in
some group with inherited or immutable characteristic to meet the burden of proof); Schwager v.
Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie
case of age discrimination).
72. BARRON ET AL., supra note 65, at 594.
Religious prejudice has taken many forms in this country. Puritans in colonial New
England banished Baptists, Catholics were discriminated against in many colonies
(there were laws prohibiting them from holding public office or starting their own
schools; some colonies taxed ship captains who transported Catholics), as were
Quakers. After the revolution, several state constitutions prohibited Jews and
Catholics from holding public office. In the 1830s, the Mormons were attacked, their
leader was killed by a mob and they were driven out of several states before finding
refuge in Utah. Just before the Civil war, the American Party, better known as the
Know-Nothing Party, became popular with its anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic views;
that anti-Catholic bigotry would be apparent in the opposition to the Presidential
candidacies of Al Smith in 1928 and John Kennedy in 1960. Antisemitism has been
present throughout our history, from prohibitions of public worship of Judaism in some
colonies to the exclusion of Jews from the neighborhoods, clubs and professions
dominated by the Protestants throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to the attacks on synagogues and virulent anti-Semitism propaganda of neoNazi groups in recent years. There was an [sic] element of religious prejudice directed
against Muslims after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the hijackers
proclaimed themselves to be devout Muslims and some Americans assumed that all
Muslims were on a mission from Allah to destroy America.
Religious Prejudice as Violation of Right to Fair Trial, 73 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 2
(2003); see also Richard Wronski, Fear of Hate Crime Lingers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2002, at A9
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Court has not yet set forth an opinion stating such, it has been argued
that these protections should be extended in the case of peremptory
challenges to prevent the same generalizations and stereotypes that are
the root of race or gender-based strikes. 7 3 By failing to recognize the
courts
similar discriminatory motive behind religion-based challenges,
74
are failing to protect the individual rights of potential jurors.
C. Unacceptable Usesfor Peremptory Challenges
The United States has a long history of discrimination, which has
been specifically aimed at particular classes. Various cases addressing

(discussing religion-based discrimination).
73. Wronski, supra note 72, at 9. Some faiths have stereotypes surrounding them, which if
allowed to influence a prosecutor's decision, would have the same effect as basing a peremptory
challenge on race or gender. See generally J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break:
Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569 (1995) (discussing the relation of
religion to juror bias for the purpose of peremptory challenges and addressing whether equal
protection principles should be applied to peremptory strikes based on religion in light of past
Supreme Court decisions holding that peremptory strikes could not be used to discriminate based
on race or gender). One source cautions: "On the matter of religion, attorneys who are defending
are advised that Presbyterians are too cold; Baptists are even less desirable; and Lutherans,
especially Scandinavians, will convict. Methodists may be acceptable. Keep Jews, Unitarians,
Universalists, Congregationalists, and agnostics." REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 123
(1983).
74. Some courts mistakenly believe "that because members of a religious faith share the same
doctrinal convictions by definition, then moral, social, political and philosophical beliefs
characteristic of the faith may fairly be attributed to all of them." Scot Leaders, Unresolved
Differences: Constitutionality of Religion-Based Peremptory Strikes, the Need for Supreme Court
Adjudication, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 99, 107-08 (1997). See also Susan Hightower, Sex and
the Peremptory Strike: An EmpiricalAnalysis of J.E.B. v. Alabama's First Five Years, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 895, 903 (2000) (discussing the impact of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. on peremptory
challenges and showing that the case has done little to extend restrictions on the peremptory
challenge although many predicted the opposite effect).
Other than the differing views on religion, courts have been extremely reluctant to
extend the supervision of Batson and J.E.B. to peremptory strikes against other
categories of jurors. Both before and after J.E.B., people of Italian American descent
have been found to be a cognizable racial group protected under Batson from
discrimination based on national origin in the use of peremptory challenges. Yet lower
courts have refused to extend Batson to a plethora of other categories. Classifications
on which challenges are still permissible include veniremembers' age, reservations
about the death penalty, socioeconomic status (including unemployment or poverty),
occupation, disability, and obesity. On the other hand, a California appellate court
recently held that gays and lesbians cannot be excluded from juries under the state
constitution. In an interesting line of cases growing out of the Supreme Court's
decision in Duren v. Missouri, plaintiffs have asserted that states are guilty of
discrimination against women jurors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause when
they refuse to pay for child care, particularly for sequestered jurors, but those claims
are a step removed from the subject of the peremptory strike and so far have been
unavailing.
Id. at 903-04 (footnotes omitted).
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discriminatory actions related to peremptory challenges directed at
certain groups of individuals will be presented in this section. This Part
will begin by discussing Strauder v. West Virginia and the Supreme
Court's opinion that the statutory exclusion of African-Americans from
juries is unconstitutional.7 5 This Part will next review the Court's
Swain v. Alabama opinion, and the resulting burden of proof related to
race-based peremptory challenges. 76 Part III.C.3 will introduce Batson
v. Kentucky as the Supreme Court's definitive opinion on the
constitutionality of racial discrimination in jury selection. 77 Then, Part
III.C.4 will discuss the limitations on Batson, while Part III.C.5 will
look at the recent Supreme Court decision outlawing gender-based
peremptory challenges. 78 Parts III.C.6-7 will then address peremptory
challenges based upon religion and discuss two state supreme court
79
cases dealing with the constitutionality of such challenges.
1. The Exclusion of African-Americans from Juries: Strauder v. West
Virginia
Racial discrimination in particular has an extensive history in the
United States judicial system. 80 Many scholars have commented on the
failure to provide African-Americans with equal rights and equal
protection in the antebellum South.8'
In addition, although
75. See infra Part II.C. 1 (discussing Strauder v. West Virginia and stating that in all states,
African-Americans were to be protected by the same laws as their white counterparts, which also
prohibited states from depriving African-America defendants the right to have African-American
jurors); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879) (holding a state statute
preventing African-Americans from serving on juries unconstitutional since it violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
76. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Swain v. Alabama and holding that although peremptory
challenges are not necessarily subject to equal protection scrutiny, they cannot be used to
specifically exclude African-American jurors); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227
(1965) (holding that the Constitution does not require an explanation of the motives behind
peremptory challenges).
77. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, which revisited the reasoning in
Strauder); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (holding that intentionally
excluding African-American jurors violates equal protection and denies the accused an unbiased
judgment by his peers).
78. See infra Parts II.C.4-5 (discussing Purkett v. Elem, and J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B.);
see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (discussing pretextual reasoning for
peremptory challenges following the Batson v. Kentucky decisions); J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) (discussing the State's use of gender as a basis for a peremptory
strike).
79. See infra Parts II.C.6-7 (addressing peremptory challenges and religion and opinions
discussing the issue from the Minnesota and California Supreme Courts).
80. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW, 34-39 (1997) (discussing
legalized discrimination against African-Americans in antebullum America).
81. Id. Many authors and scholars have commented on the social policies in effect before the
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Reconstruction sought to eliminate the maltreatment of AfricanAmericans, racially motivated violence and discrimination continued
for many years following the surrender of the Confederacy in 1865.82
Before the Civil War, Massachusetts was the only state that permitted
African-Americans to serve on juries. 83 During the Reconstruction era,
some Southern jurisdictions began allowing African-American men to
serve; however, officials in other states routinely barred all AfricanAmericans from the venire. 84 One of the first cases to challenge a state
statute barring African-Americans from jury service was heard by the
Supreme Court in 1876.85 Strauder v. West Virginia arose from an
American Civil War, especially the victimization of African-Americans based on the failure to
offer them the protections of the criminal law. Id. "Malcolm X spoke of how he 'learned to hate
every drop of that white rapist's blood that is in me."' Id. (quoting MALCOLM X, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, 2 (1965)). "In the writings of Toni Morrison [and] Patricia
Williams ... the rape of slave women surfaces time and again as unredressed violation." Id.
82. Id. at 39-68 (discussing violence against African-Americans from before the Civil War
until the civil rights movement one hundred years later). "Throughout the 1860s and 1870s,
congressional hearings, newspaper accounts, and magazine articles were filled with stories
featuring blacks who were beaten, murdered, raped, or robbed by angry, resentful, racist Southern
whites whom local authorities were either unwilling or unable to restrain or punish." Id. at 39.
83. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 169.
84. Id. The exclusion of African-Americans from jury service was handled both overtly and
clandestinely, as seen in this quote from an African-American newspaper: "We have been told for
eight years past [that] the names of colored men have been in the jury box . .. [but] not one
colored man's name has ever been drawn." Id. (quoting Colored Tribune, June 3, 1876, which
discussed African-American exclusion from juries). See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 876-901
(1994) (examining the history of discrimination against suspect classes in criminal juries and the
long struggle undertaken by minority groups to attain the right to sit on a jury); Jeffrey S. Brand,
The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection; Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 511, 572-620 (1994) (discussing the impact of Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny
and arguing that the judicial system has been unable to successfully discover and combat racially
motivated peremptory challenges); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 75-101 (1990) (discussing the constitutional repercussions surrounding the use of
peremptory challenges, especially as they relate to race and illuminating the inherent injustice of
the all-white jury); see generally Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black
Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 421-82 (1986) (discussing the
evolving civil rights of African-Americans in the Antebellum North in the years following the
Civil War and the complexity of race relations during that time); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries,
Jurisdiction and Race Discrimination:The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 1401, 1406-14 (1983) (examining the pre-Batson era and offering a historical treatment of
race and peremptory challenges).
85. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a state statute preventing
African-Americans from serving on juries unconstitutional); see also Michael J. Plati, Comment,
Religion-based Peremptory Strikes in Criminal Trials and the Arizona Constitution: Can They
Coexist?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 883, 886-88 (1994) (discussing the history of Equal Protection Clause
violations and peremptory challenges); Captain Denise J. Am, Government Appellate Division
Notes: Batson: Beginning of the End of the Peremptory Challenge?, 1990 ARMY LAW. 33, 34-37
(1990) (outlining the history behind Batson v. Kentucky); see generally Newton N. Minow and
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objection to a West Virginia statute enacted in 1873, which expressly
limited jury service to white males.8 6 The plaintiff in Strauder, an
African-American male, was convicted of murder in a West Virginia
circuit court in October 1874.87 The jury that convicted the plaintiff
was made up solely of white males, pursuant to a state statute. 88 The
plaintiff appealed the conviction, averring that he was deprived of his
9
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.8
The Court found it critical in its determination of the plaintiff's
constitutional challenge to consider whether, in jury selection,
prosecutors can purposefully and categorically exclude persons of the
defendant's race. 90 In deciding Strauder, the Court attempted to
interpret the reach of the recently drafted amendments to the
Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 1 The purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure the freedom and equal
protection of recently emancipated African-Americans, who had been
92
denied the same civil rights granted to white citizens.
Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631,
654-62 (1991) (discussing the effect of media on the general biases all potential juries).
86. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312. The law in question was enacted on March 12, 1873, and
defined citizens eligible to serve as jurors as "[a]ll white male persons who are twenty-one years
of age and who are citizens of this State." Id. at 305.
87. Id. at 304.
88. Id.
89. Id. Before the criminal indictment commenced, the plaintiff (then defendant), presented
his petition stating:
[B]y virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be
a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the state; that white men are so
eligible, and that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had
reason to believe, and did believe, he could not have the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and that he had less chance of enforcing in the courts of the
State his rights on the prosecution, as a citizen of the United States, and that the
probabilities of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take
place on the indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he
was a white man.
Id.
90. Id. at 305
91. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment states that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
92. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. Preceding cases showed that when this amendment was added
to the Constitution, it was created in the pursuit of equality and the elimination of racial
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In Strauder, the Court specifically held that the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to ensure that African-Americans were subject
93
to and granted protection by the same laws as their white counterparts.
More specifically, the Court explained that the Amendment dictated a
positive immunity, or right, granted to African-American citizens. 94 In
addition, the Court held that the state had violated the Constitution by
depriving African-American defendants the opportunity to have people
of their own race judge their actions. 95 The Court's subsequent decision
and
to strike down the statute was the first major decision to recognize
96
observe the rights of African-Americans as related to jury service.

hierarchy. Id. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 49 (1873) (discussing, in
consolidated cases, a Louisiana statute held to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
93. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
94. Id. at 308. The Court held that West Virginia's statute inflicted multiple harms, including
one specifically burdening the entire African-American community:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all
right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color,
though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id. In addition to harming the African-American community as a whole, the Court also
recognized the harm done specifically to the defendants as individual citizens: "It is not easy to
comprehend, how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury...
selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected
by the law with the former." Id. at 309. This positive immunity is essentially the exemption from
"legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing
them to the condition of a subject race." Id. at 308.
95. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 171.
96. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. Although Strauder served to outlaw statutes excluding
African-Americans from juries, states still managed to prevent the race from fully enjoying this
right. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 172. In an effort to articulate this trend, shortly after
Strauder, Gilbert T. Stephenson published his findings after a project in which he sent
questionnaires to the clerks of court in every Southern county where African-Americans made up
at least one half of the population. Id. at 172-73. Some of Stephenson's responses were as
follows:
Alabama- County No. I, 10,000 white people, 13,000 Negroes: "Negroes are not
allowed to sit upon juries in this county. It sometimes happens that names of Negroes
are placed in our jury-box by mistake on the part of the jury commissioners, and are
regularly drawn to serve as jurors; this, however, is a very rare occurrence. Once in the
past four years, a Negro was drawn as a grand juror (by mistake) who appeared and
insisted upon the court's impaneling him with other jurors, which was done in
accordance with law, the court having no legal right to discharge or excuse him. My
recollection is he served two days, when he was taken out at night and severely beaten,
and was then discharged by his own petition by the court. This will convey to your
mind that negro jurors are not wholesomely regarded and tolerated in this county."
Georgia - County No. 1, 5,000 white people, 24,000 Negroes: "No Negroes serve on
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2. Swain v. Alabama and the Initial Challenge of Using Peremptory
Strikes Based Upon Race
After Strauder outlawed the statutory ban of certain races from juries,
prosecutors began to rely on peremptory challenges to create the same
exclusionary effect. 97 Swain v. Alabama was the first case concerning
98
Swain dealt with the
these racially motivated peremptory strikes.
conviction and sentencing of an African-American man by an all-white
99 During voir dire, the
jury for the rape and murder of a white woman.
our jury. There are no Negro names in the jury box."
Georgia - County No. 10, 2,500 white people, 4,000 Negroes: "There has never been a
Negro juror to serve in this county nor any other county surrounding this to my
knowledge... I am, satisfied if one should be put on any jury that the white men on
would flatly refuse to serve at all."
North Carolina - County No. 2, 11,000 white people, 19,000 Negroes: "I will say that
Negroes do not serve on the jury in this county and have not since we, the white
people, got the government in our hands."
South Carolina - County No. 4, 18,000 white people, 41,000 Negroes: "We are careful
and painstaking in making our lists; therefore, we never allow a Negro to serve for the
reason of the general moral unfitness, and general depravity."
Id. at 173 (quoting Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 254-68
(1969)). In situations where a county refused to permit African-Americans to serve on the jury,
the African-American defendants usually did not have the money to hire an attorney to make the
appropriate Constitutional challenge to the law. Id. at 174. Obtaining a competent lawyer to
make an argument against the county was also difficult because many of the attorneys depended
upon the "good will" of the white citizens and were therefore reluctant to attack the local
government and jeopardize their careers. Id. In fact, in 1959, a panel, composed of federal court
of appeals judges, took judicial notice that "lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions
rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries." Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir. 1959)).
97. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965) (noting a defendant is not
constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury that tries him).
See generally Michael W. Kirk, Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments: The Swain Song Of The
Racially Discriminatory Use Of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821,
823-27 (1986) (discussing Swain v. Alabama and the State's use of peremptory challenges to
specifically remove African-Americans from the jury in a case with an African-American
defendant); Honorable George Bundy Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptory
Challenges to Strike Blacks From Juries, 27 HOW. L.J. 1571, 1572-95 (1984) (discussing states'
use of peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans from juries).
98. See generally Swain, 380 U.S. at 227-28 (holding that the Constitution does not require an
explanation of the motives behind peremptory challenges).
99. Id. At the time of the trial in 1965, twenty-six percent of the people eligible for jury
service were African-American; however, no African-American had served on a jury in the
county since 1950. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 194; see also Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrotsto
Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45
ALA. L. REV. 403, 433 (1994) (highlighting the persistent racism in the criminal justice system
and suggesting ways for future law enforcement officials, lawyers, and judges to eliminate the
underlying biases); Alfredo Mirande, "Now that I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar ['I'm Not
Allowed to Speak']": The Implication of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV.
115, 120 (1996) (discussing Swain and the percentage of African-Americans available in the
county to serve on a jury); James B. Zouras, Shaw v. Reno: A Color-Blind Court in a Race-
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prosecutor struck all six African-American jurors. 10 0 Although the
defense objected to the state's peremptory strikes, the trial court ruled
of Alabama
against the constitutional challenge; the Supreme Courts
10 1
decision.
court's
trial
the
affirmed
and the United States
The United States Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the
Constitution required a trial court judge to scrutinize the motives behind
a peremptory strike if the prosecutor was using them as a tool for
litigation.10 2 The Court noted that peremptory challenges by the State
10 3
are appropriate as long as they are rationally related to the case at bar.
In addition, the Court held that subjecting peremptory challenges to
equal protection analysis and forcing strict scrutiny review would be
fallacious and insulting to the very intent behind the peremptory
challenge. 10 4 The Court further reasoned that allowing all peremptory
challenges to go without examination would effectively render all
groups equally susceptible to exclusion. 105
However, the Court did recognize that the use of peremptory
challenges by states as a means to specifically exclude AfricanAmericans from the jury was in violation of one's constitutional
rights. 10 6 Although the Court recognized and prohibited the use of
strikes in a discriminatory manner, it also established an exceedingly
high evidentiary burden for the party attempting to prove
Conscious Society, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 976-92 (1995) (discussing the racism that is
prevalent in major voting rights, affirmative action and jury selection cases).
100. Swain, 380 U.S. at 204.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 222. According to the majority:
The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's
challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case ...[this] presumption is
not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that
in the case at hand all Negroes were removed ... because they were Negroes...
[allowing another result] would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory
challenge system as we know it.... Therefore it is permissible to insulate from inquiry
the removal of Negroes from a particular jury.
Id.
103. Id. at 223. Peremptory challenges are appropriate if they are founded upon "acceptable
considerations related to the case ... the particular defendant involved and the particular crime
charged." Id.
104. Id. at 221. The majority opined that this treatment would lead to "a radical change in the
nature and operation of the challenge [because it] ... would no longer be peremptory, each and
every challenge being open to examination." Id.
105. Id. at 212. Each and every group would be uniformly at risk regardless of "whether they
be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes." Id.
106. Id. at 224. In an effort to prevent African-Americans, as a class, "the same right and
opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population" by
using peremptory strikes "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial" would violate the Constitution. Id.
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discrimination. 1 7 The Court held that an equal protection violation
would be found only if the defendant showed a history or trend of
removing African-American jurors during voir dire. 10 8 Due to the
extreme burden associated with proving unconstitutionality, many
defendants were unable to counter the state's use of the peremptory
strikes.' 0 9 Although the opinion of the Court made little, if any,
practical difference in the elimination of African-Americans from juries,
Swain was the first case to at least recognize that peremptory challenges
were subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 110
3. The Burden of Swain Revisited in Batson v. Kentucky
Twenty years after Swain, the Supreme Court again evaluated the
parameters surrounding a state's use of peremptory challenges in Batson
v. Kentucky. 1 1' Batson became the leading case for assessing the
107. Id. The Court stated that "it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of
Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable
considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular
crime charged." Id. at 223. In essence, the Court was allowing prosecutors to legitimately take
race (among other considerations) into account when using their peremptory challenges.
KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 196. In addition, the Court held that the prosecutor could not use
racially charged peremptory challenges for reasons "unrelated to winning a given case," which
translated into the exemption from constitutional scrutiny as long as the challenge was "trialrelated." Id.
108. Swain, 308 U.S. at 224. More specifically the Court required that the State "in case after
case, whatever the circumstances ... be responsible for the removal of Negroes... with the
result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id. at 222-23.
To overcome this presumption, the accused must bring forth, from cases other than the
one involving the accused, evidence that the State used its peremptory challenges to
[o]nly proof of this
dismiss all the members of a particular race from jury service ....
nature would support a reasonable inference that African-Americans were being denied
the right to serve on a petit jury in violation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Michelle Mahoney, The Future Viability of Batson v. Kentucky and the PracticalImplications of
Purkett v. Elem, 16 REV. LITIG. 137, 143 (1997). Many courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Pearson, observed that overcoming this burden of proof requires tremendous
diligence on the part of the defendant. See generally United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207,
1214-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussing the application of the burden set forth in Swain v. Alabama).
The court specifically asserted that this would "require [the] checking of the docket for a
reasonable period of time for the names of defendants and their attorneys, investigation as to the
race of the various defendants, the final composition of the petit jury and the manner in which
each side exercised it peremptory challenges." Id. at 1217.
109. Id. at 1216.
110. Swain, 308 U.S. at 224.
111. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 (1986) (holding that a state's peremptory
challenge would be deemed unconstitutional as violative of equal protection unless supported by
a race neutral explanation). See also Cheryl A. C. Brown, Challenging the Challenge: Twelve
Years after Batson, Courts are Still Struggling to Fill in the Gaps left by the Supreme Court, 28
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constitutionality of a peremptory challenge. 112 The petitioner in Batson
was an African-American male indicted on charges of second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods.' 13 After excusing certain jurors
for cause, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike all four
African-American persons on the venire, resulting in an all-white
jury. 114 The defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before
115
swearing in, citing a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
However, the trial judge held that the parties were entitled to strike any
members of the venire. 116 The judge fully denied the petitioner's
motion, and the jury subsequently convicted the petitioner on both
counts."I 7 After the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 389-402 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Batson v.
Kentucky and also highlighting the necessity of the precedent set by Batson); Kirk Pittard,
Withstanding Batson Muster: What Constitutes a Neutral Explanation?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 985,
990-98 (1998) (explaining Batson v. Kentucky's race-neutral explanation requirement while
determining that a juror's race or gender may still tangentially play a role in the peremptory
strike); Audrey M. Fried, Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting Jurorsfrom the Use of
Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1319-27
(1997) (discussing racially motivated peremptory challenges and arguing that a "No New Trial"
Rule should be imposed so as not to grant defendants new trials because of an attorney's
unethical peremptory strikes); Stephen R. DiPrima, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials
after Batson and McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 903-13 (1995) (discussing the
consequences of Batson v. Kentucky and suggesting further steps that should be taken to eliminate
unfair practices in peremptory challenges); Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The
Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process,46 BAYLOR L.
REV. 947, 956-79 (1994) (discussing Batson v. Kentucky and the burden of showing a raceneutral explanation for a challenged peremptory strike and the possible expansion of equal
protection beyond race, ethnicity and gender); Stephen I. Shaw, Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's
Response to the Problem of Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 581, 582 (1986) (highlighting Batson v. Kentucky as the Supreme Court's response to
racially motivated peremptory challenges).
112. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100. The majority opinion recognized that it was forced to reexamine the holding in Swain with respect to the "evidentiary burden placed on a criminal
defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury." Id.at 82. Ultimately,
"the Supreme Court discarded that part of its Swain decision that imposed 'a crippling burden of
proof' on defendants victimized by the use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from petit
juries." Shirley Baccus-Lobel, Six Strikes and You're Safe: The All-White Jury, 30 LITIG. 14, 15
(2004).
113. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
114. Id. at 83.
115. Id.
116. Id.The petitioner argued that the State violated his constitutional rights to an impartial
jury "and to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community." Id. The trial court judge
"conducted the initial phase" of voir dire and allowed for certain jurors to be excused for cause,
which is in line with the authority granted by Kentucky's Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mahoney,
supra note 108, at 145.
117. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
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courts, citing an equal protection violation."
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by citing
Strauder's holding that a defendant is in fact denied equal protection
when members of his own race have intentionally been excluded from
the jury.11 9 The Court also noted that racially motivated peremptory
challenges are unlawful because they deny the defendant the very
unbiased right to judgment by his peers that the Constitution
intended. 120 The Court reiterated the holding of Strauder, stating that
racial discrimination in jury selection hurts both the accused and those
who are denied the right to serve on a jury because of their race. 12 1 The
opinion also addressed the risk of jeopardizing the public perception of
the justice system by allowing the State to use their challenges in the
proposed discriminatory manner. 122 The Court expressed concern that
society might begin questioning the
by allowing race-based challenges,
23
courts.1
the
of
objectivity
The Batson opinion was an opportunity to revisit the flawed

118. Id. at 84. The Court accepted the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment argument and held
that:
[R]acial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life and
liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends
on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability to impartially consider
evidence presented at trial .... A person's race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a
juror. Accordingly ... the Equal Protection Clause forbids [a] prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
defendant.
Id. at 87-89.
119. Id. at 85.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 87. The Court specifically opined:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or
liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends
on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability to impartially consider
evidence presented at a trial .... A person's race simply is "unrelated to his fitness as
a juror."
Id. (quoting Thiel v. S. Railroad Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)).
122. Id. Not only would allowing the strikes harm the defendant and certain races, but it
"extends beyond that ...to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully
exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice." Id. (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983); Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)). McCray v. New York was a case in which an African-American man
was accused of robbing a white man. McCray, 461 U.S. at 968. At the defendant's first trial, in
which the jury was unable to reach a verdict, all three African-Americans on the jury voted for an
acquittal. Id. At the second trial, the prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to remove all
seven African-Americans who were on the panel of potential jurors, which resulted in the
defendant's conviction. Id.
123. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
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evidentiary burden established in Swain, and the Court accordingly held
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits all racially-motivated
peremptory strikes. 124 Two main principles formed the foundation of
the opinion: (1) prosecutors habitually abuse of peremptory challenges;
and (2) the larger and more encompassing belief that racial
discrimination by a state is per se unacceptable. 125 The first principle,
the overuse of race-based peremptory challenges, centered on the
compulsive frequency with which prosecutors were striking certain
races from the jury. 2 6 Even Justice White, who authored Swain,
concurred with the majority, stating that Swain should have presented a
127
better framework for the government's use of peremptory challenges.
The Court intended the second principle to contrast Swain by asserting
that racial discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges by
the State is unacceptable, regardless of frequency. 128 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court effectuated a three-step procedure to ensure the
elimination of racially motivated peremptory challenges. 129 The first
124. Id. at 84-85. "Batson withdraws permission for prosecutors to use race as a basis for
peremptorily striking potential jurors, even if a prosecutor sees removing blacks as the best way
to obtain a jury most sympathetic to the state's side in a given case." KENNEDY, supra note 80, at
204-05.; see also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 449-507 (1996) (discussing Batson
and its progeny as well as the struggle to preserve the peremptory challenge, while also
eliminating racial discrimination and finally questioning whether the peremptory challenge
should in fact be preserved).
125. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
128. KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 205. The racially motivated use of peremptory challenges is
inappropriate "not only.., when used to disenfranchise black potential jurors consistently, but
also when used as a trial-related tactic in a single instance." Id. The Batson Court held that "[a]
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such
discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions... [and] to dictate that several must
suffer discrimination before one could object.., would be inconsistent with the promise of equal
protection for all." Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 965 (1983)
(alterations in original) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
129. Id. at 96. The procedure for a challenge coming out of these cases, in detail are:
1. The opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie case of ethnic,
racial, or gender discrimination, by disproportionate strikes, disparate treatment (in
questioning, for example), a pattern of discriminatory treatment over time, or some
other evidence.
2. The burden of production then shifts, and the proponent of the strike must offer a
non-discriminatory (e.g. race neutral) explanation, which need not be "persuasive, or
even plausible.
3. The trial court then "determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination."
Only at this step does "the
persuasiveness of the justification" become relevant, and "implausible or fantastic
justification may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful
discrimination."
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step involved showing, through a prima facie case by the defendant, that
jury. 130
there had been purposeful discrimination in the selection of the
In order to establish this prima facie case, the defendant needed to prove
that he was not only a member of a cognizable racial group, but also
that the State exercised131its peremptory challenges to remove members
of the defendant's race.
The second step shifted the burden to the State to give a race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenge. 132 Although the prosecutor's
standard was not arduous, it was insufficient to simply rebut the
defendant's challenge by stating that the jurors would have been more
1 33
The
sympathetic to the defendant because of their common race.
third and final step was for the trial court, based on the arguments from
both the state and the defendant, to determine whether or not the
peremptory challenge was in fact based purely on race. 134 The Court
ultimately held that, according to the steps set forth, the failure of the
its actions warranted that
prosecution to give a race-neutral reason for 35
the case be remanded for further proceedings. 1

4. If the trial court accepts the proponent's explanation, that determination will involve
a credibility assessment, at least in part, and a reviewing court therefore will accord the
trial court's ruling great deference.
Baccus-Lobel, supra note 112, at 19-20.
130. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Some cases have held that "striking a single African-American,
at least where voir dire was limited, was sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination."
Baccus-Lobel, supra note 112, at 19 (citing Morse v. Hanks, 172 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 1999)).
131. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. "A prima facie case means an allegation supported by facts that,
if left unrebutted, give rise to an inference that the allegation is true. Among the facts that might
give rise to an inference of discrimination are a pattern of strikes against jurors of a given race or
the prosecutor's statements and questions during voir dire." KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 205.
The defendant must show that the facts presented "raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race... [this] raises the
necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97; see generally
United States v. Greene, 36 M.J. 274, 282 (C.M.A. 1993) (holding that a peremptory strike based
on "ethnic sexual behavior" was in violation of the Batson requirements).
Although this requirement seems to compromise the
132. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
"peremptory character" of the challenge, the explanation offered by the State need not rise to the
level "justifying [the] exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. However, the prosecutor cannot
rebut the defendant's prima facie case merely by "denying that he had a discriminatory motive or
'affirming] [his] good faith in making individual selections." Id. at 98 (quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
133. Id. "When the prosecutor offers a nonracial explanation, the defendant can, of course,
then seek to show that the nonracial explanation is a mere pretext. Ultimately, though, the
defendant must persuade the judge that race played a part in the prosecutor's decision to strike the
juror in question." KENNEDY, supra note 80, at 205-06.
134. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
135. Id. at 100.
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4. Purkett v. Elem: Persuasive and Plausible Motives Behind
Peremptory Challenges?
In 1995, the Supreme Court tested and further clarified the Batson
rule in Purkett v. Elem. 136 In Purkett, the State removed two AfricanAmerican males from the jury panel in a case against an AfricanAmerican respondent for alleged second-degree robbery in Missouri. 3 7
The respondent fulfilled the first step of Batson, making out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination, when he filed his petition
challenging the State's actions. 138 The justification given by the
prosecutor for the dismissal of the jurors came into question when he
explained his motives as relating to the hairstyles of the respective jury
39
candidates. 1
In determining whether the strikes were purposeful race
discrimination, the Court concluded that the State's justification did not
have to be persuasive, or even plausible, in order for the Court to move
on to the third and final step of a Batson challenge. 14 ° The Court held
that a peremptory challenge based on a potential juror's long, unkempt
hair, mustache, and beard fulfilled the State's burden of articulating a
nondiscriminatory motive for the challenge.141 In fact, the Court stated
136. See generally Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (discussing pretextual reasoning for
peremptory challenges following the Batson v. Kentucky decision).
137. Id. at 766.
138. Id. at 767.
139. Id. at 766. The prosecutor's explanation of his strikes:
I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair.
He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to me to not be a
good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length,
curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a goatee type beard. And juror
number twenty-four also has a mustache and goatee type beard. Those are the only
two people on the jury ... with the facial hair ....
And I don't like the way they
looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards
look suspicious to me.
.Id. The trial court was apparently content with the prosecutor's response and, without further
inquiry, empaneled a jury that ultimately convicted him of second-degree robbery. Mahoney,
supra note 108, at 165.
140. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. "At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial
validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Id. (quoting
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991)). At the second stage of a Batson challenge, a
trial court judge may not choose to disbelieve a "silly or superstitious" reason for the strike as
long as it is race-neutral. Id. Demanding a persuasive or plausible explanation at the second step
"violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
141. Id. at 769. See generally Jason Hendren, Peremptory Challenges After Purkett v. Elem,
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that the reason offered would be deemed race neutral unless the
142 By
prosecutor's explanation inherently implied discriminatory intent.
clarifying that the second Batson step only requires a race-neutral
explanation (plausible or not) before moving into a analysis of that
reason in step three, the Court shed light upon the application of a
Batson challenge.' 4 3 By further clarifying Batson's requirement of
of potential
non-discriminatory intent, both cases secured the right
1
a4
challenges.
peremptory
race-based
from
jurors to be free
5. Batson's Application to Gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B.
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson led to cases questioning the
45
constitutionality of peremptory challenges based on gender. 1 Relying
on Batson, in 1994, the Supreme Court reviewed J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex

115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995): How to Judge a Book By Its Cover Without Violating Equal Protection,
19 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 249 (1997) (reviewing constitutional analysis of peremptory
challenges and discussing the reasoning behind and consequences of the Purkett decision).
142. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 786.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a state's
peremptory challenge would be deemed unconstitutional unless supported by a race neutral
explanation).
145. See generallyJ.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (discussing the State's
use of gender as a basis for peremptory challenges). Historically, whether strikes were being used
based solely on gender was not an issue because, like African-Americans, women were not
permitted to serve on juries. Anna M. Scruggs, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Strike Two For
The Peremptory Challenge, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 549, 556 (1995). While race was given
protection from this exclusionary use of peremptory challenges after Batson, until J.E.B. v.
Alabama, gender-based challenges were not afforded this same scrutiny. Id. at 549. Women were
not permitted to serve on juries until 1946, when in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946), the Supreme Court held that "purposeful and systematic exclusion of women from the
jury venire in a federal case was inconsistent with congressional intent to make the jury a cross
section of the community." Id. at 557 (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 191-93). In Ballard, the
Court opined:
It is said.., that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within a community
will be as truly representative as if women were included. The thought is that the
factors which tend to influence women are the same as those which influence the
action of men - personality, background, economic status - and not sex. Yet it is not
enough to say that women, when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class.
Men likewise do not act like a class .... The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one has on the other is among the
imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case made an
iota of difference.
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94. Even after Ballard,some states continued to prevent women from
serving on juries outright, or through structural conditions placed on the jury selection process.
Scruggs, supra, at 557. These measures were not completely done away with until 1966 when
Alabama, the only state to still hold this position, permitted women to serve. Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Justice and Juror,20 U. GA. L. REV. 257, 269 (1986).

310

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

rel. T.B., and applied equal protection analysis.' 46 In J.E.B., the Court
was confronted with the issue of whether the Equal Protection Clause
called for the same level of scrutiny for both race-based and genderbased peremptory challenges. 147
The State of Alabama filed a
48
complaint for paternity and child support against the petitioner, J.E.B.1
The trial court initially assembled a panel of thirty-six potential jurors,
twelve of whom were male. 149 Using nine of its ten available
peremptory challenges, the State struck all of the remaining male jurors,
leaving an all-female jury. 150 Before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, both the trial court and the appellate court denied the
petitioner's objection to the State's use of the peremptory challenges. 15 1
The Court ultimately held that peremptory challenges based on
gender were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, because, like
race, gender is an unlawful ground upon which to evaluate juror
competence. 152 Responding to the State's argument that the strikes
centered on the belief that male jurors would have been more
sympathetic to the defendant's case, the Court refused to allow the State
to employ gender stereotypes. 153 In making its point, the Court
146. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128-29. "In Batson v. Kentucky... this Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the exercise of peremptory challenges
by a prosecutor in a criminal trial." Id. at 128. The Court also stated that "although a defendant
has no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race,' ... the
'defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria.' Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.79, 85-86 (1986)).
147. Id. at 129. The issue, as worded in the opinion, concerned whether the Fourteenth
Amendment "forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, just as it prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. After three jurors were removed for cause, only ten males remained in the pool. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 129-30. Petitioner argued that the "logic and reasoning of Batson v. Kentucky,
which prohibits peremptory strikes solely on the basis of race, similarly forbids intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender." Id. at 129. The trial court however rejected this claim and
found the petitioner to be the father of the child and therefore liable for child support. Id. The
Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Alabama Supreme Court
refused to grant certiorari. Id. at 129-30.
152. Patricia Henley, Improving the Jury System: Peremptory Challenges, at
http://www.uchastings.edu/plri/spr96tex/juryper.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). "[Gjender, like
race, [is] an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality." Id.
153. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Court
asserted that it would not "accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very
stereotypes the law condemns."' Id. The State argued that its decision to strike all of the males
from the jury was based upon:
[T]he perception, supported by history, that men otherwise totally qualified to serve
upon a jury in any case might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of a
man alleged in a paternity action to be the father of an out-of-wedlock child, while
women equally qualified to serve upon a jury might be more sympathetic and receptive
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maintained that the State failed to provide any rational, let alone
154
persuasive, reasoning for its blatant, gender-based discrimination.
After moving through the historical propensity for the exclusion of

women from jury service, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
specifically compared gender-based discrimination to that based on
race.155 The reasons supporting the similar treatment of these classes
centers on the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 156 The
Court cited to previous cases which had led to the treatment of gender
as a suspect class, therefore requiring an exceedingly persuasive
157
justification for any classification of this nature.
to the arguments of the complaining witness who bore the child.
Id. at 138-39.
154. Id. at 139.
Respondent offers virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an
accurate predictor of juror's attitudes; yet it urges this Court to condone the same
stereotypes that justified the wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot
box. Respondent seems to assume that gross generalizations that would be deemed
impermissible if made on the basis of race are somehow permissible when made on the
basis of gender.
Id. at 139-40.
155. Id. at 140. Justice Blackmun writes that,
[D]iscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or gender causes harm to the
litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from
participation in the judicial process. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire
proceedings.
Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)). "The message it [allowing
the peremptory strikes] sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of
the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed
unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could
disagree." Id. at 142.
156. See id. at 127.
157. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that discriminatory
treatment of gender is based on fallacious impressions); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(stating that gender stereotypes are archaic misconceptions); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (holding that gender-based classifications are outdated and threaten government policies);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (discussing the constitutionality of limiting jury service
to specific groups). Treating gender as a suspect class is founded upon our Nation's "unfortunate
history" of sexual discrimination, which is likened to racial discrimination. Id. at 136. In support
of this treatment, the Court cites Frontiero v. Richardson:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil war slave codes.
Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or
convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children ... And although
blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and political rights" - until adoption of
the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)).
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6. Why Religious Affiliation Should be Subject to the Same Scrutiny
as Race and Gender
As Batson led to cases questioning the constitutionality of genderbased peremptory strikes, so did the Supreme Court's opinion in J.E.B.
lead to cases regarding the permissibility of peremptory challenges
based on religion. 15 8 Before examining religion-based peremptory
challenges, it is important to recognize how the Supreme Court has
protected religion in previous cases. 159 The Supreme Court has
traditionally applied strict scrutiny to legislation that limits the free
exercise of religion. 160 For a governmental act or policy to be narrowly
tailored, and therefore pass strict scrutiny, it must entail the slightest
possible amount of restriction in carrying out its purpose. 161 In Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Court ruled that if the
objective of a law is to infringe upon or restrict religiously motivated
practices, the law is not neutral, and is per se invalid unless coupled
with a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. 162 In Lukumi Babalu, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to specific city ordinances that infringed upon the free exercise
of religion. 163 The case specifically concerned the religious practices of
the Santeria religion, which involves the ritualistic sacrifice of
animals. 164 These sacrifices are traditionally performed on various
occasions, including births, marriages, deaths, at the initiation of new

158. See infra Part II.C.7 (examining State v. Davis and People v. Wheeler, in which the
Minnesota and California Supreme Courts consider peremptory challenges based on religion) and
Parts III.A-B (exploring how different districts have dealt with peremptory challenges with
regard to religious beliefs and affiliation).
159. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (citing to Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah for the proposition that laws that restrict religious practices are per se invalid
unless narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest).
160. See generally Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a
governmental action concerning religion, and subsequently determining that the government's
interest was not strong enough to warrant upholding the regulation).
161. Leaders, supra note 74, at 110. "In the case of peremptory strikes, the litigant can easily
use the voir dire process to accurately ascertain the beliefs of the potential juror." Id. If the
beliefs held by the potential juror prove to be prejudicial, then the juror can be removed for cause.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (2000) (providing that prospective jurors may be "excluded by the
court on the ground that such person may be unable to render impartial jury service").
162. Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533.
163. Id. at 546
164. Id. at 524. The Santeria religion, which originated in the nineteenth century, teaches that
every person has a destiny from God "fulfilled with the aid and energy of the orishas." Id. "The
basis of the Santeria religion is the nature of a personal relation with the orishas, and one of the
principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice." Id. It is believed that "the orishas are
powerful but not immortal. They depend for survival on the sacrifice." Id. at 525.
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members and priests, and for the cure of the sick. 165
The congregants of the Santeria religion in this case were organized
as a corporation under Florida law for the purpose of bringing the
mostly secret practices of the religion out into the open. 166 In response
to these plans, the City of Hialeah, Florida, adopted several ordinances
prohibiting animal sacrifices and imposing fines and imprisonment on
violators. 167 After both the district court and court of appeals upheld the
ordinances as constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
found that because the laws were not neutral and targeted religion, they
must undergo the highest level of scrutiny. 168
This same strict scrutiny has been applied to all such governmental
acts threatening an individual's free exercise of religion., 69 Applying
strict scrutiny in the case of peremptory challenges would result in the
Court being forced to weigh the least restrictive means for preserving
the governmental interest in a fair trial. 170 It would likely be found that
the best way to obtain impartiality would be by questioning a potential
juror, and then removing him or her based upon any prejudice shown, as
opposed to removing all jurors of a certain religious class. 171
7. State Court Cases Regarding Religion and Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory strikes based on religion have been questioned because
they are not narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny analysis. 172 Two
state supreme court cases have addressed whether to apply strict
scrutiny to peremptory challenges based on religion. 173 This Part will
165. Id. at 525. "Animals sacrificed in Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves,
ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep and turtles." Id. After the animals are killed, they are "cooked
and eaten, except after healing and death rituals." Id.
166. Id. at 525-26. The president of the petitioner church, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc., was one of the highest ranking officials in the Santeria religion. Id. at 525. The church
acquired land in the City of Hialeah, Florida, and planned to further its initiative by establishing a
worship center, cultural center, school and museum. Id. at 525-26.
167. Id. at 526-27.
168. Id. at 546. The Court held that in order to justify restricting religion, a law must advance
a critical government interest and "must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." Id.
169. Id. at 547.
170. Id.
171. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 (1994) (holding that even if some
measure of accuracy is present in using gender stereotypes, it is not constitutionally valid to rely
on these generalizations).
172. Leaders, supra note 74, at 109. Religion-based peremptory strikes are "based on
stereotypical assumptions about the religious views of potential jurors.... Focusing on the
actually held beliefs of venire members instead of inferring their beliefs from mere religious
affiliation is a less restrictive alternative. Id.
173. See generally United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d. Cir. 2003) (drawing the
distinction between unconstitutionally striking a juror on the basis of religious affiliation and
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begin with a discussion of State v. Davis, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota decision stating that peremptory strikes based on religion do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 17 4 Next, this Part will discuss
Justice Thomas's dissent in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Davis v. Minnesota.175 Finally, this Part will discuss the Supreme Court
on any
of California's 1978 decision that a peremptory challenge based 176
Constitution.
the
under
unlawful
is
religion,
group bias, including
a. State v. Davis: The Supreme Court of Minnesota's Opinion
In August of 1993, the Supreme Court of Minnesota heard and ruled
on State v. Davis.177 The issue presented to the court was whether the
Batson holding, which prohibited peremptory challenges based on race,
should be extended to afford the same protection to challenges based on
religion. 178 In Davis, the defendant was an African-American male
charged with aggravated robbery. 179 During jury selection, the
prosecution did not strike any jurors for cause, but did use one of its
180
peremptory strikes to remove an African-American from the jury.
Defense counsel objected to this strike and asked for a race-neutral
explanation from the prosecutor, who maintained that her choice had
nothing to do with the race of the juror. 18 1 The prosecutor instead
offered that her exercise of the peremptory strike was in response to the
constitutionally striking a juror on the basis of a heightened religious devotion); United States v.
Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998) (examining whether Batson applies to religion, and
noting the divergence in opinions among the courts); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1993) (discussing the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in response to a potential
juror's affiliation with the Jehovah's Witness faith).
174. The case was later appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied
certiorari. See infra Part II.C.7.a (discussing the Supreme Court of Minnesota's opinion in State
v. Davis); see also Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (discussing the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges in response to a potential juror's affiliation with the Jehovah's Witness faith).
175. See infra Part II.C.7.b (discussing Justice Thomas's dissent in the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota); see also Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing the prosecution's use of a
peremptory challenge in response to a potential juror's affiliation with the Jehovah's Witness
faith).
176. See infra Part II.C.7.c (discussing the California Supreme Court opinion in People v.
Wheeler); see also People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (holding that use of peremptory
challenges based on any group bias is an equal protection violation).
177. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 767. "In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals concluded
that because the peremptory strike was based on race-neutral grounds there was no equal
protection violation, and, after reviewing the other claims of error, affirmed the defendant's
conviction." Id. 767-68.
178. Id. at 767.
179. Id.at 768.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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juror's religion. 182 Because of the prosecutor's perception that the
Jehovah's Witness faith incorporated a reluctance to judge others, she
did not believe that the potential juror could carry out the tasks
necessary as a member of the jury. 183 Defense counsel did not rebut the
prosecutor's justification for the challenge, and the trial court
subsequently ruled that the peremptory challenge would stand.84
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the
Batson line of cases discussed above.185 The court then compared racebased and religion-based peremptory challenges, illuminating how each
of these challenges could potentially impair the reliability of the jury. 8 6
The court opined that a peremptory challenge based on religion is not as
commonplace or flagrant as those used to discriminate against AfricanAmerican jurors pre-Batson.187 Using this as justification, the court
182. Id. The prosecutor explained:
[I]t was highly significant to the State that the man was a Jahovah [sic] Witness. I have
a great deal of familiarity with the sect of Jahovah's [sic] Witness. I would never, if I
had a preemptory [sic] challenge left, strike or fail to strike a Jahovah [sic] Witness
from my jury. In my experience that faith is very integral to their daily life in many
ways, many Christians are not. That was re-enforced [sic] at least three times a week
he goes to church for separate meetings. The Jahovah [sic] Witness faith is of a mind
the higher powers will take care of all things necessary. In my experience Jahovah
[sic] Witness are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this
Court House.
Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra Part II.C.1-4 (discussing the Batson line of cases dealing with peremptory
challenges and race).
186. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 769-70.
If the life of the law were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be extended
to include religious bias and, for that matter, an endless number of other biases. The
question, however, is whether the peremptory strike has been purposefully employed to
perpetuate religious bigotry to the extent that the institutional integrity of the jury has
been impaired, and thus requiring further modification of the traditional peremptory
challenge.
Id. The court noted that if it were to extend the peremptory challenge protection to religion, that
the list would continue to grow, and eventually defeat the very purpose of a peremptory challenge
by stating:
The claim that the [peremptory] rule is in hopeless conflict with the [Batson] challenge
is frequently linked to the suggestion that the ban on jury discrimination must
inevitably expand to prohibit not only jury selection based on race, but also jury
selection based on religion, national origin, gender, language, disability, age,
occupation, political party, and a host of other categories. The relationship between the
two points is clear: the longer the list of prohibited categories, the less room there is for
a lawful challenge other than a challenge for cause.
Id. at 70 n.2 (quoting Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Whose Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 , 761 (1992)).
187. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771. While the court noted the well-documented trend of racial
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reasoned that challenges based on religion do not have the same
ubiquitously negative effect on juries as race. 188 Therefore, the court
held that religion-based peremptory strikes should not be afforded the
89
same protection. 1
The court also based its opinion on the particular illusiveness of
religious biases and the impediments to determining a potential juror's
religious background or beliefs. 190 The court noted that a potential
juror's religious beliefs may be the basis for his or her moral values,
19 1
which could lead to his or her societal perception on various matters.
However, the court argued that these societal views cannot be attributed
solely to one's religion, and therefore a peremptory strike based on
them cannot inevitably be the result of religious bias. 192 In addition, the
court discussed the risks associated with the defendant's argument 1as
93
they related to the veiled appearance associated with religion.
Although some denominations require certain clothing or other
perceptible signs of affiliation, many do not, causing complication when
194
inquiring into the religion of every peremptorily dismissed juror.
Upon consideration of the above, the court195 denied the defendant's
objection to the use of peremptory challenges.
b. Justice Thomas's Dissent in Davis v. Minnesota
In 1994, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the
defendant's petition for certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota.196 However,
discrimination that led to Batson, it stated that there has not been a similar history of
discrimination regarding religion. Id. at 770-71.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court reasoned:
We are not aware [that] the peremptory [challenge] is being so misused [as it was with
regard to racial discrimination], nor does the defendant make any such claim. No such
problem is documented in appellate court decisions.... [T]here is no indication that
irrational religious bias so pervades the peremptory challenge as to undermine the
integrity of the jury system.
Id. at 771.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court held that "[t]o extend Batson would complicate and erode the peremptory
challenge procedure unnecessarily, and it would not serve to remedy any long-standing injustice
perpetrated by the court system against specific individuals and classes, as Batson clearly does."
Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (dissent from denial of
certiorari discussing the use of peremptory challenges based on religion); see supra Part H.C.7.a
(discussing the Supreme Court of Minnesota's decision in State v. Davis).
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Justice Thomas's dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, offered a strong
argument as to why the Court should not only have heard the case, but
also should have reversed the decision denying the defendant's
97
challenge. 1
Justice Thomas began by acknowledging that the Supreme Court of
Minnesota's basis for denial, that only race-based peremptory strikes
are prohibited, is shattered by J.E.B. v. Alabama.19 8 Using the rationale
found in J.E.B., Justice Thomas opined that there was no reason to deny
the protection of Batson to all suspect classes, not only race and
gender. 199
Justice Thomas further challenged the majority by
recognizing that the refusal to extend the Batson protection is in essence
choosing to avoid the ramifications of J.E.B.2°° The dissenting opinion
concluded with the realization and acknowledgement that subjecting
peremptory challenges to equal protection analysis may result in the
"doom of the strike altogether," but that it is appropriate, based on prior
20 1
cases, to make this extension.

197. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. at 1115 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
198. Id. See supra Part II.C.5 (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court extended its Equal Protection
analysis under Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory strikes).
199. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. at 1115.
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal protection scrutiny
and those that receive what we have termed "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny,
J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes
based on the latter category of classifications-a category which presumably would
include classifications based on religion.
Id.
200. Id.; see also A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration
of the Batson Rule, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 447-48 ("By extending Batson beyond race, the
Court left open the possibility of further extending scrutiny of peremptory challenges to other
suspect classifications").
201. Davis, 511 U.S. at 1115.
While the denial of certiorari to a case arising from a strike based on a religious
classification may indicate that the Court does not want to further extend Batson, the
Court has left itself open to such petitions on all of the grounds previously discussed.
Although the Court may be able to draw theoretical lines among quasi-suspect
classifications, it would seem that it will only be a matter of time before empirical
arguments can be made about other classifications just as they have been made about
race and gender. Even though racial minorities and women have suffered specific types
of discrimination, it may also be that persons born out of wedlock can establish that
they have been denied political rights or persons who are illegal aliens can show that
discrimination against them is often a proxy for race just as gender can be. It is perhaps
significant that in the Court's own statement that the peremptory challenge has not
been eliminated, the Court points to the availability of classifications of individuals
subjected to "rational basis" review as potential areas for litigants to explore in their
use of the peremptory challenge, but it does not point to the availability of other quasisuspect or inherently suspect groups.
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c. The California Supreme Court's Decision in People v. Wheeler
In contrast to State v. Davis, in People v. Wheeler, the California
Supreme Court held that challenges based on any group bias violates the
The defendants were two AfricanEqual Protection Clause. 20 2
American men convicted of murdering a white grocery store owner
during the course of a robbery. 20 3 Throughout voir dire, the prosecutor
struck every African-American from the venire, and the resulting allwhite jury convicted the defendants. 20 4 The defense raised an objection
to the removal of all of the African-Americans. 20 5 Although prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson, the California Supreme Court held
that the removal of a specific class from the venire was
unconstitutional.2 °6
The lower court's conviction was reversed on the grounds that
striking a potential juror on the basis of any group bias, including race
or religion, violated state law. 20 7 The Supreme Court of California held
that while peremptory challenges are most times appropriately
motivated by biases such as prior arrests or victimizations, it is
improper to allow a party to remove a juror based on a bias that has no
specific relation to the case at bar.20 8 When a potential juror is removed
Lisa Lee Mancini Harden, The End of the Peremptory Challenge? The Implications of J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B. for Jury Selection in Alabama, 47 ALA. L. REv. 243, 260 (1995).
202. See generally People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the use of
peremptory challenges based on any group bias is an equal protection violation).
203. Id. at 752.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 753-54. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, stating that "seven Negroes...
have been kicked off the jury by [the prosecutor], I make a motion for mistrial. It is apparent that
it is a policy of the district attorney's office not to permit any Negroes on this jury." Id.
206. Id. at 761-62.
207. Id. The court cited several cases wherein the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that an impartial jury is to be drawn from a "representative cross-section of the community."
Id. at 759. From this, the court then opined that in order to achieve the appropriate cross-section,
a jury will inevitably be made up of:
[D]iverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national
origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and
political affiliation, [and] that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions,
preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such
groups; and hence that the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to
encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the
respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to
cancel each other out.
Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 761. Biases based on previous arrests or convictions, or whether a potential juror
has been the victim of a crime are:
[E]ssentially neutral with respect to the various groups represented on the venire: the
characteristics on which they focus cut across many segments of our society- [tihus
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due to a bias founded on characteristics such as race, religion, or
ethnicity, the court held that the very rationale behind a jury is
defeated. 2°9 The purpose of a jury is to establish a representative group
to judge the actions of the accused, and by allowing a peremptory strike
based on any group bias, including religion, this demographic balance
would be upset. 210 For this reason, the California Supreme Court
reversed the conviction by the jury from which the prospective jurors
had been removed.2 1 '
III. DISCUSSION
As in the state courts, there are varying opinions concerning religion
and peremptory challenges among the circuits.2 12 This Part will begin
by introducing United States v. Stafford, a Seventh Circuit opinion
written by Judge Posner, which, in dicta, insinuates that the court would
not extend Batson's constitutional protections to a peremptory strike
based on the religious beliefs of a potential juror, but perhaps would
extend the protection to religious affiliation. 2 13 Then, this Part will
move into the recent Third Circuit decision, United States v. DeJesus,
which also affirmed the notion that a peremptory strike exercised on a
religious participation is not an equal
potential juror's heightened
2 14
violation.
protection

both blacks and whites may have prior arrests, both rich and poor may have been crime
victims, both young and old may have relatives on the police force, both men and
women may believe strongly in law and order, and members of any group whatever
may alienate a party by "bare looks and gestures." It follows that peremptory
challenges predicated on such reasons do not significantly skew the population mix of
the venire in one direction or another; rather, they promote the impartiality of the jury
without destroying its representativeness.
Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 768.
212. See infra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing how the courts dealt with peremptory
challenges with regard to religious beliefs in United States v. Stafford, and United States v.
DeJesus). See supra Parts II.C.7.a-c (discussing the decisions regarding religion and peremptory
challenges coming from the Supreme Courts of Minnesota and California).
213. See infra Part III.A (explaining the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Stafford,
which held that a juror's religious convictions could be a race-neutral reason for using a
peremptory challenge).
214. See infra Part III.B (discussing the Third Circuit's opinion in United States v. DeJesus,
which held a peremptory strike based on religion is valid and constitutional); see also DeJesus,
347 F.3d 500, 509-11 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing peremptory challenges exercised by the State to
remove two jurors based on their degrees of religious involvement). See supra note 8 and
accompanying text, (introducing the idea that such a strike is not an equal protection violation).
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A. The Seventh Circuit's Take on Religion and Peremptory Challenges:
United States v. Stafford
In late 1997, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard United
States v. Stafford.2 15 In this case, the two defendants were convicted of
2 16
a variety of charges stemming from an advance-fee loan scam.
During voir dire, the government peremptorily removed the only
African-American juror for reasons related to her religious beliefs. 2 17
The government backed its decision by explaining its concern that the
potential juror, who testified to having strong religious convictions,
would be sympathetic to the defendant.2 18
The court began its discussion like the court in Davis, exploring the
Supreme Court's Batson analysis, and the feasibility of its application to
religion. 2 19 Batson requires that the State provide a race-neutral
explanation when challenged by a defendant in regard to the motive
behind a peremptory challenge. 220 The court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the reason given by the State, that her religious propensities
would not allow her to perform her duties, was race-neutral and an
acceptable basis for the peremptory strike. 22 1 However, the court also
recognized the possibility that religion could carry the same stigma as
race and stated in dicta that there is a difference between striking a juror
based on her religious affiliation and striking a juror based on her
religious beliefs.22 2 This discussion by the court alluded to its likely
215. Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1109.
216. Id. at 1111. An advance-fee loan scam is set up where the defendants make a "phony
offer of a large loan on highly advantageous terms upon condition that the borrower pay a
sizeable fee in advance.... [then] [t]he con men pocket the fee and abscond." Id.
217. Id. at 1113. During the questioning, the African-American juror said that she was "very
deeply involved with my church. I coordinate our homeless ministry program and have done so
for the past seven years through our church." Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1114.
220. Id. See supra Part ll.C.3 (discussing Batson v. Kentucky).
221. Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1114. "When in response to a Batson challenge the prosecutor
gives a race-neutral reason that persuades the judge, there is no basis for reversal on appeal unless
the reason given is completely outlandish or there is other evidence which demonstrates its
falsity. Neither condition is satisfied [here]." Id.
222. Id. The court stated in its opinion that:
It is necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a religion's general tenets, and
a specific religious belief. It would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike
a juror on the basis of his being a Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc. It would be proper to
strike him on the basis of a belief that would prevent him from basing his decision on
the evidence and instructions, even if the belief had a religious backing; suppose for
example that his religion taught that crimes should be left entirely to the justice of God.
In between and most difficult to evaluate from the standpoint of Batson is a religious
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hesitance223to grant Batson's protections to peremptory strikes based on
religion.
B. United States v. DeJesus: The Most Recent Look at Religion-Based
Peremptory Challenges
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. DeJesus is a recent
court of appeals affirmation that a peremptory strike based on religious
beliefs is valid and constitutional.22 4 In DeJesus, the defendant was
charged with the illegal possession of a firearm after police, responding
to the report of a stolen car, found him with a gun and two magazine
clips. 225 During jury selection, the State used peremptory challenges to
strike two African-American jurors who both spoke of their religious
involvement and spiritual beliefs during voir dire.226 In response, the
defense counsel asserted a Batson challenge, claiming that the
227
prosecution removed potential jurors on the basis of their race.
Consequently, the State was asked to articulate the reason for its strikes.
The State rationalized both of the strikes on the religious inclinations of
that
these beliefs would affect
the two potential jurors and the prospect 22
8
their willingness to convict the defendant.
In response to the State's justification, defense counsel urged the trial
outlook that might make the prospective juror unusually reluctant, or unusually eager,
to convict a criminal defendant.
Id.
223. Id.
224. United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2003).
225. Id. The defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial because of the jury's inability to reach a
verdict. Id. The following retrial resulted in the defendant's conviction and subsequent
sentencing to 110 months in prison. Id.
226. Id. The voir dire process in this trial consisted first of a questionnaire distributed to and
completed by the potential jurors. Id. This phase was followed by the more traditional
questioning of the jurors, and then by the opportunity for the parties to exercise their peremptory
challenges. Id. The first potential juror who was peremptorily removed stated that he had a
cousin who had been murdered, but that: "he had learned to forgive the murderer," his hobbies
involve "civic activities with his church," "he reads the Christian Book Dispatcher;" he "holds
several biblical degrees," he "is a deacon and Sunday School teacher in the local church;" and he
"sings in a couple of church choirs." Id. The second potential juror who was removed by a
peremptory challenge stated during voir dire that: "he is an officer and trustee in his church," "he
reads the Bible and related literature," and "his hobbies are church activities." Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 502-03. The first juror was specifically struck based on his "high degree of
religious involvement and his ability to forgive his cousin's murderer, both of which might make
him reluctant to convict." Id. The second potential juror was removed from the jury because
when he was brought in from the jury pool, he "looked the government's way and then turned his
eyes away several times." Id. at 503. The state reasoned that this behavior "demonstrated a
possible anti-government prejudice ... [and that the juror's] fairly strong religious beliefs might
prevent him from rendering judgment against another human being." Id.
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court to extend Batson by arguing that peremptory strikes based on a
potential juror's religion are just as violative of the Constitution as those
based on a juror's race.2 2 9 The district court denied the defense's
challenge and accepted the State's strikes based on the religious
grounds given by the prosecutor.2 30 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court and held that the strikes were
constitutional. 23 '
In its opinion, the Third Circuit did note that a peremptory strike
based on a potential juror's religious affiliation would violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 232 Nevertheless, the court approved the State's
argument that it had not exercised the peremptory challenges based on
the jurors' religious affiliations, but rather on their heightened religious
involvement. 233 Using this rationale, the court affirmed the district
234
court's approval of the State's peremptory challenges.
IV. ANALYSIS
Based on the discussed cases and history related to religion and
peremptory challenges, this Part will explain why the Supreme Court
should afford religious affiliation strict scrutiny analysis when dealing
with peremptory challenges. 235 This Part will also, however, address
the concern regarding the potential eradication of the peremptory
challenge as a litigation tool if this protection is granted.23 6
A. Why Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation Are
Improper
The use of peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation is
flawed for several reasons. 2 37 First, such challenges violate the Equal
229. Id.
230. Id. The district court's opinion stated that "while Batson may extend to protect against
striking a potential juror based upon the juror's membership in a particular religious
denomination having no relevance to the issues in the case, none of these jurors were struck by
the government upon an impermissible ground." Id. at 504.
231. Id.at510.
232. Id. The court stated that the defendant argued that the District Court "correctly assumed
that a strike based on a juror's religious affiliation would be unconstitutional." Id. at 509.
233. Id. at 510.
234. Id.atm5o-11.
235. See supra Parts I1B..1, II.C.6 (discussing religion as a suspect class and the suggested
treatment of peremptory challenges based on religion).
236. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the potential effect of allowing peremptory challenges to
be held up to equal protection analysis in all suspect class forums).
237. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text (maintaining that peremptory challenges,
based on generalized views of religion, eliminate individual distinctions by assuming identical
values among individuals in a group).
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Protection Clause. 238 Equal protection is founded upon the prohibition
of the government treating classes of persons differently, or from
239
By
merely treating individuals as members of a general class.
is
in
government
the
stereotypes,
or
allowing the use of generalizations
240 Batson
violation of the constitutional rights guaranteed to individuals.
and J.E.B. held that peremptory challenges based on class
generalizations were unconstitutional and struck down those based on
a class
race and sex. 24 1 Like race and gender, religious affiliation is 242
challenges.
peremptory
exercise
to
upon which it is inappropriate
Second, religion-based peremptory challenges are inappropriate
because it is erroneous to assume that all members of a certain
identifiable group share identical values, and therefore the strikes are
not narrowly tailored. 243 Empirical evidence supports the notion that
not all members of a certain religion adopt the views of the
establishment. 244 For instance, while the common belief that all
238. See supra Parts II.B.I, II.C.6 (examining religion as a suspect class and the suggested
treatment of peremptory challenges based on religion).
239. Leaders, supra note 74, at 103. Equal protection analysis requires "that the government
must treat citizens as individuals and not simply as components of a racial, religious, sexual, or
national class." Id. See generally Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (discussing the
challenge of a Minnesota statute imposing reporting requirements for certain religious
organizations).
240. Leaders, supra note 74, at 108. When a litigant ascribes moral, philosophical, political or
social views to a potential juror merely because he or she fits into a religious group, "the potential
juror is being treated as a component of his religion and not as an individual." Id.
241. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the intentional exclusion of
African-Americans in a trial involving an African-American defendant was per se
unconstitutional) and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (opining that genderbased peremptory strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also supra Part H.C.3 and Part II.C.5 (examining Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B. and the United States Supreme Court holdings that peremptory challenges based on race
and gender are equal protection violations).
242. Barton, supra note 54, at 204-05.
243. See generally Leaders, supra note 74 (discussing the stereotypes associated with religion
and the mistaken perceptions about religious groups).
244. Id. at 108. For example, while the Catholic faith is against the use of contraceptive,
studies show that as much as eighty-four percent of its members disagree with and oppose this
view. BRENDA MADDOX, THE POPE AND CONTRACEPTION: THE DIABOLICAL DOCTRINE, 29
(1991); Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1993 145 (Scholarly Resources, 1994). This
fact goes to show that while religion may affect one's moral or social views, it certainly does not
unconditionally control them. In addition, it is impractical to assume that all members of a
particular religious order could in fact follow and observe all of the policies and rules of the
religion. Leaders, supra note 74, at 108. For example,
[T]he United Methodist Church has reduced all of the current and official policies
adopted by the General Conference of the United Methodist Church to writing in The
Book of Resolutions. The Book of Resolutions currently contains official positions on
over two hundred subjects including: organ and tissue donation, school bussing,
suicide, rights of workers, gun control, grand jury abuse, unemployment, and
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Catholics are opposed to abortion is a characteristic of a significant
number of Catholics, it is erroneous to attribute this belief to each and
every one. 245
These generalizations suggest that religion-based
peremptory challenges are not narrowly tailored because like in J.E.B.,
there is essentially no support for the notion that class membership
alone is dispositive proof of a juror's potential biases.246 Like race and
gender, these types of peremptory challenges are impermissibly based
247
on generalizations and stereotypes.
In addition, religion-based peremptory challenges are harmful
because they negatively affect the individual jurors removed from the
jury by insulting their constitutional right to the freedom of religion.2 48
The freedom of religion is a fundamental right that is guaranteed to all
citizens of the United States, and allowing government actions affecting
this right without applying strict scrutiny is violative of the
249
Constitution.
B. The Potential Elimination of Peremptory Challenges
Although there are strongly supported constitutional arguments for
recognition of Cuba.
Id.
In the case of race and sex, the fact upon which prediction is based, though not entirely
free from difficulties, is relatively straightforward: it is a physical fact. To found a
prediction on the basis of a person's religion, however, is to make reference to a fact of
considerable uncertainty. Thus a person's religion may refer to something about his
state of mind, to his relations with other persons or with an institution, to his external
behavior, or to his cultural inheritance.
John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34
SETON HALL L. REv. 435, 472 (2004).
245. See Catholics for Contraception, at http://www.cath4choice.org/articles/c4cbrochure
long.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (offering information, support and literature for Catholics on
how the Catholic religion and contraception can be reconciled).
246. Barton, supra note 54, at 209; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (holding gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional).
247. Barton, supra note 54, at 209. "The government has an interest in guaranteeing a fair
trial, but the lack of evidence supporting religion-based peremptory challenges' role in supplying
an impartial jury leads to the conclusion that such peremptories are not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to fit the governmental interest." Id. at 210.
248. Leaders, supra note 74, at 108-09.
249. Barton, supra note 54, at 207. "A government religious classification which results in
members of a religion being denied the opportunity to serve on a jury clearly constitutes a
'burden' on the free exercise of religion." Id. Allowing peremptory challenges based on
religious affiliation is in effect "a form of state-sponsored group stereotype rooted in, and
reflective of, historical prejudice." Lieutenant Colonel Patricia A. Ham, Crossing the l's and
Dotting the T's: The Year in Court-MartialPersonnel, Voir Dire and Challenges, and Pleas and
PretrialAgreements, 2004 ARMY LAW. 10, 22 (2004). "Such strikes, like those based on race
and gender, cause harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are
wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process." Id.
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invalidating religion-based peremptory challenges, the practical
ramifications of such a decision are somewhat staggering. 250 Allowing
further restriction on the use of peremptory challenges would be another
strike against the uninhibited use for which these devices were
This added restriction could eventually prevent the
created. 25 '
peremptory challenge from performing its primary function of ensuring
an impartial jury, consequently rendering the judicial tool obsolete.2 52
With a growing number of classifications that could trigger suspicion
under the Equal Protection Clause, granting religion this ultimate
protection may start the peremptory challenge on a slippery slope,
eventually resulting in the abandonment of the peremptory challenge
altogether. 253 Forcing the state to articulate a non-invidious motive for
a peremptory challenge, while at the same time limiting its options, is
2 5 4 Some courts
not in tune with allowing parties to strike peremptorily.
have already noted that the continual extension of peremptory strike
protection to an increasing number of suspect classes may have
255
damaging repercussions on the life of the peremptory strike.
However, it has also been noted that while peremptory challenges have
been a steadfast part of our judicial system, their elimination may not be
250. See generally Proofof Religion in the Courtroom that Violates the Right to a Fair Trial,
73 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 89 (2003) (discussing religion's relation to potential juror
bias); Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin' on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of
Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1090 (2001) (discussing how the actual
religious beliefs of a member, as opposed to the doctrinal beliefs of the religion, make
generalization difficult); Johnstone, supra note 200 at 441 (recognizing the difficulty in
correlating beliefs to specific religious affiliations in the fact of the infinite variations of each
juror's religious experience); Leaders, supra note 74; Angela J. Mason, DiscriminationBased on
Religion Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REV. 493
(1995) (examining the potential for peremptory challenges to become obsolete by offering
protection to religion).
251. Bell Chambers, supra note 73, at 608.
252. Id.; see also Mason, supra note 250, at 493, 536-37 (discussing the slippery slope by
which the peremptory challenge may be eliminated).
253. Colb, supra note 29 at 1 39.
254. Id. at T 39-40. "Once scrutiny and review are the rule rather than the exception,
peremptory challenges may become simply watered down 'for cause' challenges, in which the
reasons can be somewhat less persuasive but still permissible." Id. at 5 40.
255. A Florida appellate court case acknowledged this danger, stating "[this decision] marks
the beginning of the end of the unfettered use of the peremptory challenge in this state." Alen v.
State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hubbart, J., concurring). The court
predicted that the decision, forbidding discriminatory peremptory strikes against AfricanAmericans because of their race, would eventually extend to ban all forms of peremptory
challenges, "whether based on race, ethnic origin, nationality, gender, religion, wealth, or age."
Id. The court further opined, "it seems obvious that the peremptory challenge system, as we
know it, is totally doomed." Id. at 1087. The Florida Supreme Court also recognized that the
decision "may be characterized by some as another nail in the coffin of the peremptory challenge
system." Joseph v. State, 636 So.2d 777, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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all that negative. 256 The peremptory challenge has been argued to not
effectively remove bias from the jury. 257 In fact some studies have
shown that prosecutors peremptorily strike as many jurors that fit the
perception of unwilling to convict as those actually willing to find the
defendant guilty. 258 Ultimately, some argue that these inconsistencies
render the peremptory challenge not as beneficial to the judicial system
as first thought. 259 Therefore, although outlawing religion-based
peremptory challenges could advance the downfall of this judicial tool,
260
the consequences could be less serious than expected.
V. PROPOSAL

While state and federal courts have not yet reached a consensus on
whether peremptory strikes based on religion are constitutional, there is
a developing theme regarding the difference between religious
affiliation and religious beliefs. 26 1 To reconcile the differing opinions
among the courts, it is important that the Supreme Court grant certiorari
256. See Jeffrey Abramson, Abolishing the Peremptory, but Enlarging the Challenge for
Cause, at http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/archive/newsletters.v96n2/law/abolish/asp (Spring 1997)
(discussing the peremptory challenges' inability to eliminate bias).
The peremptory system would be worth preserving only if there were credible evidence
that it did more to remove bias from the jury (by eliminating prejudiced individuals)
than to bring it in (by skewing dynamic deliberation across group lines). But one
impressive empirical study of the pre-Batson era gave the peremptory challenge only a
mixed review. Overall, it found the "collective performance of the attorneys... not
impressive." Prosecutors were as likely to strike persons who ended up voting to
convict as to acquit. Defense counsel did "slightly better." The researchers were
mostly struck by the erratic benefits of peremptory challenges. Although on average
the defense gained an advantage through peremptory challenges, that average was
misleading because there was such disparity from case to case in the performance of
counsel. These "adversarial inequities" did not paint a pretty picture of the larger
public purposes served by peremptory challenges. The potential to imbalance the jury
was great when one side was legally entitled to a greater number of peremptory
challenges or simply had more luck or skill in using an equal number of them.
Id. at 5 16. (citing Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 513,
517-19, 528-29 (1978) and Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the
Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1082 (1995).
257. Abramson, supra note 256, at T 16.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (explaining the limitations of the
peremptory challenge).
261. Colb, supra note 29, at 5 19. See also United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114
(7th Cir. 1998) (discussing in dicta the use of peremptory challenges in relation to religious
beliefs and affiliation); United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (N.J. 2003) (examining the use of
peremptory challenges exercised by the State to remove two jurors based on their degrees of
religious involvement).
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262
on the issue and resolve the present ambiguities.
When analyzed, it should be found that discrimination based on the
religious affiliation of a potential juror is inappropriate, while the
decision is not as apparent regarding a strike based on the strength of
one's religious beliefs.26 3 Some have compared the strength of religious
264
beliefs to race and gender in terms of devotion or commitment.
Viewing one's religious conviction as opposed to religious affiliation is
similar to considering a male juror who believes that women are
unworthy of equal treatment, or a Caucasian juror who is a white
supremacist. 265 Although both of these examples involve suspect
classifications, using a peremptory strike to remove either juror is not
inherently based on a person's class (i.e., race or gender).2 66 Instead, it
is based on the intensity and conviction with which one chooses to
beliefs could interfere
observe a belief, and the possibility that these 267
with a person's participation as an unbiased juror.

If it were apparent that a juror holds great conviction in his religious
beliefs, no matter what his affiliation may be, it would probably be
appropriate to exclude that person based upon the bias brought to the
jury. 268 Therefore, while it is probably not within the boundaries of the
262. See supra Part H.C.7.b (addressing the arguments of and questions posed by the dissent
in the United States Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's petition for certiorari in Davis v.
Minnesota).
263. Theresa Osterman Stevenson states that,
[r]eligious affiliation is being viewed much the same as race or gender, while religious
beliefs are being analyzed as much closer to the sorts of things upon which we have
traditionally exercised a peremptory challenge.... A Muslim could not be struck from
the trial of a Muslim terrorist simply because he is a Muslim, any more than a Catholic
could be struck from a death penalty case simply because he is a Catholic ... [tlhe
distinction is between the potential jurors' religious status and their belief in a
particular tenet.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, Peremptory Challenges May Include Jurors' Religious Beliefs:
Courts DistinguishDegree of Religious Belieffrom Religious Affiliation, 29 A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS
1,6 (2004).
264. Colb, supra note 29, at 5 33-38.
265. Id.
[A] potential juror might describe himself as a member of the 'men's movement' who
believes that women have encroached on male prerogatives and have turned masculine
creatures into effeminate losers ... [a]nother might describe herself as a women whose
greatest loyalty is to women and who considers herself a woman first and a citizen
second. She might spend most of her time engaging in activism connected to her
commitment to women's empowerment.
Id. at T 34.
266. Id. at 33-38.
267. Id.
268. Mansfield, supra note 244, at 472-73.
Depending on what is meant by the religion of the juror, the predictive value of the fact
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Constitution to exercise a peremptory challenge based on a juror's
religious affiliation, the Supreme Court should set forth an opinion
stating that it is acceptable to strike a juror based on that prospective
2 69
juror's religious beliefs.
VI. CONCLUSION

There is a long history of discrimination in the selection of juries. It
began with the complete exclusion of African-Americans from the
venire through the use of statutes and local law. After this practice was
outlawed following the inception of the Fourteenth Amendment,
prosecutors began to rely on their peremptory challenges to create the
same effect. However, the Supreme Court found that race-based
peremptory challenges were unconstitutional and made it unlawful for
prosecutors to continue the practice of exercising them in this manner.
The Court furthered its stance on the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges with its more recent declaration that peremptory challenges
are no longer permitted based on gender.
The Supreme Court should extend this analysis and rule against the
government's ability to exercise peremptory challenges based upon a
potential juror's religious affiliation. Religion is commonly afforded
the same protections as both race and gender, and it should be no
different in the case of peremptory challenges. Because of the confusion
surrounding the topic and the divergence in the various states and
circuits, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari on the issue and opt
to prohibit the further use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors
based upon their religious affiliations and also address the issue of juror
removal based on religious beliefs.

could be great or little. Thus, if a person had said that he had a religious belief in a
God who saw no value in human law, the probability that the person would ignore the
law given to him by the judge would be considerable, whereas if all that can be said
that the juror is a 'member' of a particular church, one of whose officials has
announced such a view as church doctrine, the probability would be less.
Id. See also U.S. v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating the difference between
using a peremptory challenge based on a juror's religious beliefs and striking a juror based on that
juror's religious affiliation); State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
Batson extends to include peremptory strikes based upon religious affiliation); People v. Martin,
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing cases in which jurors have been stricken
based on their religious beliefs); State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 1994) (examining when it
is proper to strike a juror based on the juror's religious convictions).
269. See Mason, supra note 250, at 503 (stating that there has been little guidance about
whether Batson should be extended to include religious membership); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (discussing the application of strict scrutiny to religious affiliation).

